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Abstract  
Past research has shown that having a large population of ethnic minorities beyond 
the neighborhood level arouses intolerance in the majority. However, this paper 
presents the argument that the effect of minority size on tolerance depends on 
minority type: the less subject the minority is to negative stereotyping, the more 
favorable the effect that minority size has on tolerance. In this study, a hierarchical 
linear model was applied to a dataset on advanced and emerging democracies in 
Europe. The analysis shows that when the duration and level of democracy are 
controlled for, ethnic tolerance was associated positively with native minority size 
and negatively with foreign population size. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Past research on political tolerance toward ethnic minorities (hereafter referred to as 
“ethnic tolerance”) has focused on advanced democracies in which ethnic minorities are 
typically immigrants or foreigners (Weldon, 2006; Crepaz and Damron, 2009; Cote and 
Erickson, 2009). In accordance with Gibson (2006; 2007), ethnic tolerance is here 
defined as a willingness to permit varying degrees of civil rights to ethnic outgroups. 
The literature reveals that having a large share of foreigners in Western democracies, or 
of blacks in the United States, at the community (neighborhood) level encourages 
positive attitudes toward these minorities among the majority; however, having a large 
population of these minorities in the overall population beyond the community level 
arouses antipathy (Taylor, 1998; Oliver and Wong, 2003; Oliver and Meldelberg, 2000; 
Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2006; Stein et al., 2000; Dixon, 2006). The 
different effects of ethnic diversity between the two geographic levels emerge because a 
significant presence of these minority groups (above the level at which personal contact 
is possible) gives rise among the majority group to the perception of a societal threat.  
 
This paper argues, however, that the effect of minority size on tolerance above the 
community level is not uniform, instead it depends on the minority type. For minorities 
not subject to stereotyping as criminals, group size has a more favorable impact on 
tolerance than for those groups stereotypically associated with crime. The literature 
reviewed here will reveal that ethnic diversity above the community level exerts a 
negative effect when the minority group is stereotypically associated with crimes 
(foreigners in Europe and blacks in the United States); for minorities who are less 
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subject to such stereotypes, there is either no significant effect (Hispanics in the United 
States) or even a positive effect (native ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia). In 
the European context, native ethnic minorities are much less subject to criminal 
stereotyping than foreigners and immigrants, and so the effect of their population size 
on tolerance deserves scrutiny. Native ethnic minorities in Europe should not be 
neglected in tolerance studies that include emerging democracies, in which the foreign 
population accounts for only a small proportion of the ethnic minority population, as 
Table 1 indicates.  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
This paper shows by analyzing data from 29 European democracies that an increase in 
the native ethnic minority size increases the majority’s political tolerance of minorities, 
but an increase in the foreign population size reduces the majority’s political tolerance 
toward minorities, even after controlling for other country- and individual-level 
variables. 
 
 
CONCEPTUALIZING ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND TOLERANCE 
 
 
Ethnic diversity beyond the community level encourages intolerance  
 
The impact of ethnic diversity on ethnic tolerance is complex because it involves dual 
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effects. On the one hand, ethnic diversity is conducive to frequent contact between the 
majority group and minority groups, which enhances tolerance (hereafter referred to as 
the “contact effect”). On the other hand, the presence of a sizable minority can foster 
sociotropic threat perception in the majority, which fuels intolerance (hereafter referred 
to as the “threat effect”). Pettigrew and Tropp (2011: 196–200) used a structural 
equation model to demonstrate that larger foreign population ratios at the district level 
had indirect effects through increases in both the contact and threat effects, whereas the 
same ratios did not have a direct effect on attitudes toward foreigners. 
 
Although ethnic diversity is expected to increase both contact and perceived threats, the 
net impact on tolerance is not uniform. Instead, the net impact depends on which effect 
is more prominent in a given context. A growing body of literature indicates that ethnic 
diversity at the community level enhances the contact effect more than it strengthens the 
threat effect. At higher levels of aggregation, however, ethnic diversity induces the 
threat effect to a greater extent than it does the contact effect. Thus, ethnic diversity at 
the community level is associated with greater tolerance levels, but ethnic diversity at 
the municipal level or larger leads to lower tolerance levels (Taylor, 1998; Oliver and 
Wong, 2003; Oliver and Meldelberg, 2000; Semyonov et al., 2004; Wagner et al., 2006; 
Stein et al., 2000; Dixon, 2006). This discrepancy arises because tolerance in ethnically 
heterogeneous contexts is negatively affected by sociotropic threat (rather than 
individual threat), which often emanates from political discourse at the national level 
(Wagner et al., 2006: 387).  
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Anomalies: group and country differences 
 
Even above the community level, the threat effect does not always outweigh the contact 
effect. In the U.S. context, the threat effect (measured at the municipality or county 
level with reference to the size of the outgroup as a percentage of the total population) 
was observed in the attitudes of whites toward blacks, but not in the attitudes toward 
Hispanics or Asians (Taylor, 1998; Dixon, 2006).1 In the European context, Hodson et 
al. (1994) attest that the size of the native ethnic minority population has a positive 
effect on tolerance in each republic of the former Yugoslavia. These atypical cases 
indicate that the threat effect does not outweigh the contact effect when the minority 
group is not perceived as particularly threatening to the majority.  
 
In the literature generally, the majority group is said to perceive a threat when its 
members attribute crime, cultural dissonance, or job competition to outgroups (Green, 
2009: 43-44). With regard to the effect of minority size on ethnic tolerance in particular, 
stereotyping of outgroups as criminal seems to be the most decisive factor. There is 
evidence that in the United States whites associate crime (Quillian and Pager, 2001; 
Quillian and Pager, 2010; Oliver, 2010: 42-45; Drakulich, 2012) and other negative 
behaviors (Sears et al., 1999) more strongly with blacks than with Latinos or Asians. In 
Europe, a German panel study found that concerns about crime were a stronger 
predictor of anti-immigrant attitudes than economic concerns (Fitzgerald et al., 2012). 
Native ethnic minorities in Europe are usually not subject to stereotyping as criminals. 
Additionally, the enlargement of the European Union and its expanded cooperation with 
the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
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brought about new treaties and laws intended to protect ethnic minority rights (Tesser, 
2003; Agarin and Brosig, 2009), which should give support to the argument that 
political tolerance is practiced toward native ethnic minorities in Europe.  
 
In addition to examining minority type, it is also necessary to control for cross-country 
differences in institutions and social discourses. McLaren (2003) found that the foreign 
population size affected threat perception (see also Schneider (2008) for the effect of 
foreign-born population size) but not anti-immigration attitudes in Western Europe, 
which reveals important variations among countries in how the threat effect is socially 
mediated into intolerance. Semyonov et al. (2006) introduced more extensive 
country-level controls by using two-level data pooled across four times and thus showed 
that a large foreign population increased antipathy toward foreigners in Western Europe. 
Although several studies of up to 17 countries point to a positive effect (either directly 
or indirectly) from democratic experience and institutions on political tolerance 
generally (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003; Marquart-Pyatt and Paxton, 2007; 
Hinckley, 2010; but see Viegas, 2007), the influence of democratic experience and 
institutions on ethnic tolerance has yet to be fully examined for a large sample of 
countries. Country-level control variables are more extensively discussed in the 
Research Design section. 
 
To summarize the above, previous research has demonstrated that whereas ethnic 
diversity at the community level positively affects tolerance regardless of the type of 
minority, ethnic diversity above the community level appears to exert a negative effect 
when a minority group is stereotypically associated with crimes and cultural deviance; 
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for less feared and more familiar minorities, there is no significant effect or even a 
positive effect from population size. In the European context, the negatively stereotyped 
group is foreigners and the relatively unstereotyped groups are native ethnic minorities. 
Although it is difficult to precisely predict the effect of ethnic diversity above the 
community level for each type of ethnic minority, the preceding discussion makes it 
reasonable to hypothesize that the effect of the size of a native ethnic minority on ethnic 
tolerance in Europe is more favorable than the effect of foreign population size after 
controlling for individual- and country-level variables. In reality, the extent to which 
native ethnic minorities are less subject than foreigners to negative stereotyping may 
vary among countries and even among ethnic minorities within one country. This paper 
presents a preliminary attempt to test how well the differential effects of native ethnic 
minority population size and foreign population size generalize. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The dataset and the sample 
 
Individual-level data were chosen from the dataset of the Eurobarometer 71.2 survey (N 
= 29 768, May–June 2009; European Commission 2010) of 27 EU member states and 
three candidate states (Croatia, Turkey, and Macedonia), which addressed multiple 
topics. In particular, questions on general trends (QA), discrimination (QE), and 
demographics (D) were used in the present study. Respondents who indicated that they 
were a member of an ethnic minority group (4.6% of the 29 768 interviewees) or an 
unspecified minority group (0.6%) and those who selected “Do not know” (4.6%) were 
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excluded from our dataset; however, respondents who reported being a member of a 
religious minority (4.0%), sexual minority (0.7%), or minority in terms of disability 
(2.1%) were retained.  
 
Data on Cyprus were dropped from the sample because of a current conflict that is 
causing strong antipathy among its ethnic majority (Greek Cypriots) toward its largest 
ethnic minority (Turkish Cypriots). The country has been divided into Greek and 
Turkish sides by a ceasefire since the Turkish invasion in 1974, which invasion 
followed a Greece-inspired coup aimed at unifying Cyprus with Greece. For Germany 
and the United Kingdom, data from the former East Germany and Northern Ireland, 
respectively, were excluded from the sample to ensure consistency with country-level 
data. The number of interviewees from the unexcluded 29 countries was 25 677. Due to 
deletion of observations with missing values, the final sample consists of 20 076 
observations (interviewees).  
 
Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable is a response (ranging from 1 “most uncomfortable” to 10 “most 
comfortable”) to a question on having the highest elected political position of the state 
be held by a member of an ethnic minority (QE6: “And using a scale from 1 to 10, 
please tell me how you would feel about having someone from each of the following 
categories in the highest elected political position in (OUR COUNTRY): A person from 
a different ethnic origin than the majority of the population”). This measurement 
captures an interviewee’s political tolerance because it shows the extent to which that 
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individual tolerates political rights being conferred to ethnic outgroups.2 The 10-point 
response scale was treated as a continuous variable according to the convention that 
“[w]hen the dependent measure is a ratio, interval, or ordinal scale with five or more 
points, social scientists generally regard the outcome as continuous and ANOVA or 
regression-based statistics are employed” (Newsom 2012, 144).  
 
Measuring ethnic tolerance on only a single indicator is a major weakness of this study.3 
However, the drawback of a one-dimensional measurement is outweighed by the 
advantage of comparability across 29 countries, which have various durations and levels 
of democracy. Previous studies have used ethnic tolerance metrics based on multiple 
indicators, but these metrics were mostly applied to advanced democracies. The validity 
of the dependent variable is assessed in the RESULTS section by examining whether the 
dependent variable is correctly predicted by major individual-level independent 
variables that are widely known to determine tolerance. 
 
Individual-level independent variables 
 
Contact. The argument that links contact to tolerance largely draws on Allport's 
contention that various forms of contact, ranging from casual to intense, reduce 
prejudice against ethnic groups (Allport, 1954: 261-282). The effect of contact has been 
widely evidenced in the context of residential proximity (Wilner et al., 1955), integrated 
(or segregated) housing projects (Deutsch and Collins, 1951), intercommunity 
socialization (Persell, Green, and Gurevich, 2001), friendship with foreigners (McLaren, 
2003), and interracial contact (Gibson, 2006). Although intolerant attitudes may result 
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in little contact with outgroups, representing reverse causality, a meta-analysis of the 
literature (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) indicates a stronger effect from contact on 
attitudes than the reverse relation.  
 
In the present study, the level of contact was measured by whether the respondent has 
any friends or acquaintances who are either members of an ethnic minority (QE16.1: 
“Do you have friends or acquaintances who are people whose ethnic origin is different 
from yours?”) or any friends or acquaintances who are Roma (QE16.2: “Do you have 
friends or acquaintances who are Roma?”).4 A value of 1 was assigned to a dummy 
variable if the answer to either QE16.1 or QE16.2 was “yes,” and a value of 0 was 
assigned if the answers to QE16.1 and QE16.2 were both “do not know,” “no,” or a mix 
of these. A binary dummy was adopted because, logically, the “do not know” 
respondents (n = 182, or 0.7% of the total, for QE16.1 and n = 287, or 1.1% of the total, 
for QE16.2) could not have perceived being friends with any individuals of ethnic 
minority origin. 
 
Threat. Perceived threat, not to the individual but to society (Gibson and Gouws, 2003; 
Huddy et al., 2005), is a strong exogenous determinant of tolerance. Perceived threat 
from ethnic minority groups was measured by a composite index, calculated as the 
mean of three interviewee evaluations: the (1) current and (2) future (within the next 
twelve months) situation and (3) the change (in the last five years) in relations between 
people of various cultural, religious, and national backgrounds (QA2.6: “How would 
you judge the current situation in each of the following: Relations in (OUR COUNTRY) 
between people from different cultural or religious backgrounds or nationalities?”. 
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Slightly different wordings were used for the future and past situations. See QA3.7 and 
QA4.7 for the changes to questions about the future and past, respectively). Although 
this measurement only partially captures the respondents’ perception of threat from 
ethnic minorities, this measure was the closest to the target concept within the 
Eurobarometer dataset.  
 
For QA2.6, values of 1, 2, 2.5, 3, and 4 were given to the responses “very good,” “rather 
good,” “do not know,” “rather bad,” and “very bad”, respectively. For QA3.7 and 
QA4.7, values of 1, 2.5, and 4 were given to the responses “better,” “same,” (and “do 
not know”), and “worse,” respectively. The “do not know” answers were included in the 
analysis because they indicate a moderate position rather than an outlier or nonresponse. 
Additionally, due to the relatively large number of “do not know” answers, their 
wholesale deletion would have compromised the representativeness of the dataset.5 For 
reasons similar to but more specific than perceived threat, competition over employment 
and scarce resources between the majority and emerging minorities results in greater 
intolerance (Olzak, 1992), but no appropriate data were found in the dataset. 
 
Education. Educated individuals are more tolerant than less educated individuals 
(Stouffer, 1955). Education has been reported to reduce ethnic prejudice by instilling 
knowledge and information, growing cognitive capacity, and introducing universal 
values and norms (Coenders and Scheepers, 2003: 317; Hagendoorn, 1999). The 
positive effect of education on attitudes toward immigrants was found to be robust even 
after controlling for the high skill levels associated with education (Hainmueller and 
Hiscox, 2007). This study used the age at which the respondent ended full-time 
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education, which was then coded into four categories (1 = no education, 2 = age 15 or 
lower, 3 = ages 16 to 19, and 4 = age 20 or higher). 
 
Religion. Although the effect of religion on ethnic tolerance has not been widely 
explored, there is some evidence that religious affiliation (Moore and Ovadia, 2006), 
and religiosity (Eisenstein, 2006; Moore and Ovadia, 2006) have a negative effect 
(either direct or indirect) on political tolerance (but see Karpov, 1999). The results of a 
large sample study (N = 16 512) by Moore and Ovadia (2006) showed that Evangelical 
protestants are more intolerant than non-Evangelicals and also that absence of religious 
affiliation is associated with political tolerance. There is also indirect evidence from 
Gallup Poll surveys supporting a relationship between religion and intolerance. These 
surveys were conducted in various countries to show that people who regard religion as 
important in their daily lives tend to think that ethnic minorities have a hard time living 
in their communities (Crabtree and Pelham, 2013). The religion variable was coded as 1 
for affiliation with any religion or denomination and as 0 for no affiliation (atheists, 
non-believers, and agnostics). The “do not know” answers were treated as missing 
values. 
 
Political ideology, gender, age, urban residence, occupation, income, and 
socioeconomic status. Other individual-level independent variables have shown less 
consistent effects in tolerance studies but were included in this analysis as control 
variables. These sociodemographic variables are usually found in Eurobarometer 
surveys. The (recoded) political ideology variable has five values, ranging from 1 for 
the most left ideology to 5 for the most right ideology.“Refusal” responses were treated 
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as missing values, but responses of “do not know” were recoded to 3. Compared to the 
other variables, the ideology variable was more likely to be a refusal (2 326, or 8.7%) or 
“do not know” (3 124, or 11.6%) response in Eastern European countries. When “do not 
know” responses were recoded to avoid deleting them, it was considered most 
appropriate to assign the median value of the scale. However, because the median fell 
between 5 and 6 in the original 10-point scale, the scale was collapsed into a five-point 
scale, and a value of 3 was assigned to “do not know” responses. A calculation of the 
mean of the dependent variable grouped by point of the five-point left-right scale, 
revealed that the mean dependent variable for “do not know” responses (5.866) was 
closest to the mean dependent variable for the third point (5.864). In other words, the 
level of ethnic tolerance among the ideologically indifferent (“do not know”) 
respondents was very similar to that of ideologically centrist respondents. 
 
For the gender variable, women were coded as 1 and men were coded as 0. The age 
variable was coded as the respondent’s actual age. The urban residence variable was 
coded as 1, 2, or 3 for a rural area or village, a small or mid-sized town, or a large town, 
respectively. Occupations were divided into five types (self-employed; managers; other 
white collar employees; manual workers; and non-income earners, comprising 
homemakers, unemployed persons, retired persons, and students), with a dummy 
variable created for each category except for non-income earners, who act as the default 
category. Income was approximated by difficulty in paying bills (D60: “During the last 
twelve months, would you say you had difficulties to pay your bills at the end of the 
month…?”) in accordance with various Eurobarometer reports that use this question 
item as a sociodemographic indicator of income and affluence. Values of 1, 2, and 3 
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were given to the responses “most of the time,” “from time to time,” and “almost never,” 
respectively, while refusal responses were treated as missing values. The perceived 
socioeconomic status was measured by the respondent’s assessment of his or her own 
position in society (D61: “On the following scale, step '1' corresponds to ‘the lowest 
level in the society’, and step '10' corresponds to ‘the highest level in the society.’ Could 
you tell me on which step you would place yourself?”). For this question, refusal 
responses were treated as missing values. 
 
Country-level independent variables 
 
Ethnic minority and foreign population sizes. Ethnic minority size was calculated by 
subtracting from 100% the percentage of the population belonging to the largest ethnic 
majority. Ethnicity data for 21 countries were collected from the CIA World Factbook 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2012), which relied on the most recent national census 
results for 16 of these countries. For the eight included countries on which ethnicity data 
were not reported in the CIA World Factbook, the author searched for national census 
results on the internet and found 2001 census data for Greece and 2006 census data for 
France from Ethnologue (Lewis et al., 2013).6 For both countries, linguistic group data 
were used because the available data on ethnic minorities in Greece pertains to 
foreigners only and the French census does not ask respondents about ethnicity.  
 
For the remaining six countries (Denmark, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) 
about which the author failed to find national census data, the dataset by Alesina et al. 
(2010) was used.7 Alesina et al. (2010) give a breakdown of national populations by 
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ethnic, religious, and linguistic group membership. The original data sources that 
correspond to the country sample in that study include Encyclopaedia Britannica (2001) 
and Levinson (1998). From Alesina et al. (2010), the author used ethnic group data for 
Denmark, Italy, Portugal, and Spain and linguistic group data for Malta and Sweden. 
This procedure was utilized because the largest ethnic groups included in the dataset by 
Alesina et al. (2010) were very broadly defined as “Europeans” (97.9%) in Malta and 
“Western Europeans” (96.9%) in Sweden, with no distinctive elements to characterize 
the ethnic majority of the country.8 For both countries, the largest linguistic group 
categories, such as Maltese (95.3% in Malta) and Swedish (89.5% in Sweden) are more 
salient than the above ethnic group categories for distinguishing between the ethnic 
majority and minorities within “Europeans.” 9  Table 1 presents the primary and 
secondary sources of the ethnic minority data. The ethnic minority population size 
reflects the probability of an individual from the majority ethnic group encountering an 
individual from any ethnic minority group. The data include both native and non-native 
minorities, but the impact of the latter group can be controlled by including the foreign 
population size in the analysis.  
 
The foreign population size was modeled as the logarithm of the percentage of foreign 
residents in the 2009 total population (but 2008 for Croatia) (European Commission, 
2012), except that Macedonia was handled as described below. The logarithm of the raw 
value was used to normalize the distribution of the foreign population percentage, which 
was highly skewed to the right. The logarithmic transformation also ameliorated high 
collinearity between the ethnic minority and foreign population sizes.10 For Macedonia, 
statistics were not available on the size of the foreign population, but the United Nations 
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(2006) reported data on the foreign-born population of Macedonia. Macedonia’s foreign 
population percentage as of 2005 (0.2%) was estimated by assuming that Macedonia’s 
foreign-born population (6% of the total population) had the same proportion of 
foreigners as Croatia’s: as of 2005, 14.5% of Croatia’s population was foreign-born, and 
0.6% was foreign, measured as the mean of the foreign population sizes in 2001 
(Republic of Croatia, 2011) and 2008 (European Commission, 2012).11 As former 
Yugoslavian republics, both Macedonia and Croatia have large populations of 
individuals who were born in other former Yugoslavian republics (United Nations, 
2006). 
 
Democracy. Democratic political institutions are expected to encourage general political 
tolerance because they implement laws and education policies that promote equality in 
political rights among social groups. The effect of democracy was measured by its 
duration and level. The data regarding the duration of democracy were obtained from 
the 2009 POLITY IV dataset (Marshall et al., 2011b), for which the duration of a 
democracy was defined as “the number of years since the most recent regime change 
(defined by a three-point change in the POLITY score over a period of three years or 
less) or the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions 
(denoted by a standardized authority score)” (Marshall et al., 2011a, 17).  
 
A country’s level of democracy was gauged by the Freedom House Score for 2009 
(Freedom House, 2011), which was reversed such that 1 represents least free and 7 
represents most free. Not only the duration but also the level of democracy was used 
because the duration of democracy offers little information on the current level of 
16 
 
minority rights ensured by law and practice. The Freedom House uses minority rights as 
one of the criteria for calculating its Freedom House Score.12 The question on its 
checklist that is most relevant to minority rights asks, “Do cultural, ethnic, religious, or 
other minority groups have full political rights and electoral opportunities?”13  
 
Per capita real GDP. The majority of studies on political tolerance toward the 
least-liked group (and on generalized political tolerance) did not report a significant 
effect of economic development on political tolerance. If, however, the duration or level 
of democracy is strongly related to the level of economic development, spurious 
relationships will emerge. To control for such potential confounds, the per capita real 
GDP of 2009 (in thousands of 2005 Euros) was included in the model when the 
democracy variables were included. 
 
Estimation model 
  
The hypothesis is tested using a hierarchical linear model. When different levels of 
aggregation exist in the dataset, cluster-induced association between variables at two 
levels leads to artifacts in standard errors. The hierarchical linear model adjusts for this 
intraclass correlation and calculates the correct standard errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 
2002: 100). The final estimation model, which corresponds to Model 7 in Table 2, takes 
the following form: 
 
TOLij = α + β1 * (CONTACTij) + β2 * (CONTACTij * FOREIGNj) + β3 * (THREATij) +  
β4 * (EDUij) + β5 * (RELij) + β6 * (LRij) + β7 * (GENDERij) + β8 * (AGEij) + β9 * 
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(URBANij) + β10 * (OCCUP_SLFij) + β11 * (OCCUP_MNGij) + β12 * (OCCUP_OWHij) 
+ β13 * (OCCUP_MNLij) + β14 * (INCOMEij) + β15 * (SESij) + β16 * (MINORITYj) + 
β17 * (FOREIGNj) + β18 * (DEMOCDj) + β19 * (DEMOCLj) + υj + εij 
 (Equation 1) 
 
for i = 1,…, m first-level groups (individuals), j = 1,…, n second-level groups 
(countries) comprising members of group i. The following variables (meanings) are all 
at the individual level: TOLij (ethnic tolerance), CONTACTij (contact), THREATij 
(threat), EDUij (education), LRij (political ideology), GENDERij (gender), AGEij (age), 
URBANij (urban residence), OCCUP_SLFij (occupation: self-employed), 
OCCUP_MNGij (occupation: manager), OCCUP_OWHij (manager: other white collar), 
OCCUP_MNLij (occupation: manual labor), INCOMEij (income), and SESij 
(socioeconomic status). The country-level variables are MINORITYj (ethnic minorities 
percentage), FOREIGNj (logarithm of foreign population percentage), DEMOCDj 
(duration of democracy), and DEMOCLj (level of democracy). α is the intercept; βk are 
the k coefficients to be estimated; υj is the error term at the second (country) level; and 
εij is the error term at the first (individual) level.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The results of the hierarchical linear model analysis are shown in Table 2. The software 
used was HLM 6.02. Model 1 is the base model that consists of only individual-level 
variables. Because variance at the country level represents unexplained variance, Model 
1’s variance provides the basis on which change in the explanatory power can be 
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calculated to construct a new model that supplements Model 1 with country-level 
variables. The explanatory power of the newly obtained model is regarded as the 
proportion of the variance that is explained. The country-level variables are added to the 
base model one at a time, beginning with the variables of concern, which are followed 
by the more relevant control variables, and finally by the less relevant control variables.  
 
Individual level 
 
In all models, homogeneity testing of the level-1 (i.e., individual-level) variance 
indicated heteroscedasticity. When the error term is heteroscedastic, the coefficient 
estimators are unbiased but inefficient. Typically, robust standard errors are then used to 
calculate the statistical significance of the estimated coefficients. Yet, subsequent 
estimation returned robust standard errors that were smaller than conventional standard 
errors. Under such circumstances, Angrist and Pischke (2009: 293-308) recommend 
adopting conventional standard errors rather than robust standard errors to avoid 
overestimating the precision. Accordingly, precision in this analysis is based on 
conventional standard errors. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
For all models, the four major individual-level determinants of tolerance were 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level in their expected effects. Among the 
individual-level control variables, leftwing ideology, gender, youth, managerial 
occupation, income, and socioeconomic status positively affect ethnic tolerance. These 
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results indicate that although the dependent variable is represented by a single 
measurement, it captures the level of ethnic tolerance to a reasonable extent.  
 
Country level 
 
Model 2 added the ethnic minority population size variable, which included both native 
and non-native ethnic minorities, to Model 1. The coefficient for the ethnic minority 
population size variable had a positive sign but was not statistically significant. Model 3 
added the foreign population size variable to Model 2. Neither the ethnic minority 
population size variable nor the foreign population size variable had a significant effect, 
although both variables were correctly signed. Model 4 added the duration of 
democracy variable to Model 3. The duration of democracy had a positive effect (p = 
0.002) and foreign population size had a negative effect (p = 0.073); ethnic minority 
population size remained insignificant. Model 5 added the level of democracy variable 
to Model 4, which made both the ethnic minority variable (p = 0.016) and the foreigner 
variable (p = 0.004) statistically significant. In addition, the duration (p = 0.001) and 
level (p = 0.006) of democracy were significant.14 Model 6 added the per capita real 
GDP variable to Model 5 and demonstrated that the impacts of the duration and level of 
democracy on ethnic tolerance were substantive, rather than spurious, because both 
variables remained statistically significant. Additionally, the per capita real GDP had no 
significant effect on tolerance. These results from Models 2 to 6 indicate that if two 
countries have the same duration and level of democracy, the country with the larger 
native ethnic minority population has a higher level of ethnic tolerance.  
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All of the cross-level interactions were also examined in Model 5, which best fits the 
data. As a result, Model 7 turned out to be the best-fit cross-level interaction model. 
Model 7 shows that the effect of contact on tolerance is buttressed when the foreign 
population percentage is large. In other words, having no ethnic minority friends in 
countries with large foreign population sizes generates greater intolerance compared 
with the same situation in countries with smaller foreign population sizes. Such an 
interaction effect was absent for the native ethnic minority population size. In summary, 
the results support the working hypothesis: the size of a native ethnic minority 
population has a more favorable effect on ethnic tolerance than the size of the foreign 
population after controlling for individual- and country-level differences.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
By analyzing data on 29 democracies in Europe, the present paper demonstrated that 
when the duration and level of democracy are controlled for, the size of the native 
ethnic minority population enhances the majority’s political tolerance toward minorities, 
but an increase in the size of the foreign population reduces the majority’s political 
tolerance toward minorities. It was also found that the larger the size of the foreign 
population, the stronger the negative effects on tolerance from limited personal contact; 
however, such conditional effects were not observed for the size of native ethnic 
minority populations. This difference implies that if the population to be tolerated is 
relatively unknown (e.g., foreigners), then negative stereotyping that exaggerates threats 
from the outgroup is more persuasive for larger outgroups. Negative stereotyping of 
better-known ethnic minorities, however, will be of limited effect. Other evidence 
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demonstrated that conventional determinants of political tolerance at the individual and 
national levels apply without modification to ethnic tolerance. 
 
The conclusions of the present study are subject to certain conditions and limitations; 
thus, they require further scrutiny. The present findings were only shown to hold when 
the model was controlled for the duration and level of democracy, which reveals a 
sobering truth: democracy is the primary determinant of political tolerance, including 
tolerance toward ethnic minorities. The positive result, however, is that in emerging 
democracies, a greater presence of native ethnic minorities can partly offset limited 
democracy. Another limitation of the present results is that the sample covered only 
European countries. The inclusion of democracies in other regions of the world would 
allow for control of a potential European bias that may stem from attitudinal or 
institutional legacies of the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. In 
addition, the present study did not distinguish between different native ethnic minorities 
and regarded them as invoking less threat perception than foreigners. The extent to 
which a given ethnic minority might arouse threat perception could be measured by the 
presence and strength of regional political parties (Brancati, 2008). Because it was not 
possible to identify regional parties for 12 of the 29 countries included in the present 
study, regional party variables were not used. Future research could introduce new 
approaches or perspectives to address these issues. 
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Endnotes
                                                 
1 The contact effect was found for all types of ethnic outgroups, according to Dixon 
(2006). 
2 This measurement also captures attitudes toward non-native ethnic minorities because 
even if new immigrants are not eligible to be elected to the highest political position of 
the state, their children are eligible in many countries.  
3 A possible alternative indicator of ethnic tolerance was a response to the question 
regarding job opportunity measures for ethnic minorities: QE7.1 “Would you be in 
favour of or opposed to specific measures being adopted to provide equal opportunities 
for everyone in the field of employment? Measures such as, for example, special 
training schemes or adapted selection and recruitment processes, for people depending 
on their ethnic origin.” However, responses to the above question seems to indicate 
views on labor market intervention more strongly than views on outgroup tolerance. 
The Spearman rank-sum correlation coefficient between the responses to QE7.1 and to 
QE6.1 was only 0.23 (p<0.001, n=22 184), but the same correlation coefficients 
between the response to QE7.1 and QE7.2 to QE7.6 (gender, sexual orientation, age, 
religion, and disability) were all above 0.60 (p<0.001). It was thus considered 
inappropriate to use QE7.1 as a measure of ethnic tolerance.  
4 Using only QE16.1 to measure the contact variable did not modify its effect on 
tolerance. 
5 Gibson (1992: 563, fn6), a leading theorist of political tolerance, also included “do 
not know” answers in his dataset and scored them as a 3 on the 5-point tolerance scale. 
Oesterreich (2005) also gave a value of 3 to “difficult to say” answers on the 5-point 
scale of authoritarian personality. 
6 The ethnic majority population percentage was obtained by dividing the number of 
people in the largest linguistic group in the census year reported in Ethnologue (Lewis 
et al., 2013) by the total population (as of the same year) reported in Eurostat data 
(European Commission, 2012).  
7 For compiling their dataset, Alesina et al. (2003) mostly used secondary sources and 
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looked for census data when there were no secondary sources. 
8 These categories are chosen to accord with the data source (Levinson, 1998). 
9 Regarding data on Portugal in Alesina et al. (2012), the term “Europeans” is more 
appropriate than the term “Portuguese-speaking” to identify the actual ethnic majority 
because Europeans are distinct from the people of Portugal’s former colonies: 
Portuguese is used as the first language of almost the entire population, including 
people from former colonies. 
10 For using a logarithmic transformation to handle collinearity between demographic 
variables, see White et al. (2008). 
11 A Macedonian diplomat, who the author interviewed by telephone in November 2011, 
also estimated the foreign population to be around 0.1% of the total population. 
12 The POLITY score, on the basis of which the duration of democracy was measured, 
does not explicitly include any elements of minority rights. 
13 See the fourth question under the category of political pluralism and participation in 
the Checklist Questions and Guidelines (Freedom House, 2011). 
14 When a variable for level of democracy was added to Model 3, none of the variables 
had any significant effect. 
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Table 1. Ethnic-Minority and Foreign Populations in 29 European Democracies (%) 
Country 
Ethnic 
minority 
pop. (A) 
Foreign 
pop. (B) 
Sources of (A) dataa 
_____________________________________ 
 Secondary        Primary        Date 
Advanced democracy      
Denmark 4.2  5.8  Alesina et al. (2010) EB (2001) 1996 
Italy 5.9  6.5  Alesina et al. (2010) EB (2001) 1983 
Finland 6.6  2.7  CIA (2012) n.s. 2006 
Germany 8.5  8.8  CIA (2012) n.s. n.s. 
Austria 8.9  10.3  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
France 8.9  5.8  Lewis et al. (2013) Census 2006 
Sweden 10.5  5.9  Alesina et al. (2010) EB (2001) n.s. 
Ireland 12.6  9.9  CIA (2012) Census 2006 
Britain 16.4  6.8  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
Netherlands 19.3  3.9  CIA (2012) Estimate 2008 
Luxemburg 36.9  43.5  CIA (2012) Census 2000 
Belgium 42.0  9.4  CIA (2012) n.s. n.s. 
Mean 15.1  9.9      
Emerging democracy     
Portugal 2.4  4.2  Alesina et al. (2010) Levinson (1998) n.s. 
Greece 2.5  8.3  Lewis et al. (2013) Census 2001 
Poland 3.3  0.1  CIA (2012) Census 2002 
Maltab 4.7  4.4  Alesina et al. (2010) EB (2001) n.s. 
Hungary 7.7  1.9  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
Czech Republic 9.6  3.9  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
Croatia 10.4  0.4  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
Romania 10.5  0.1  CIA (2012) Census 2002 
Slovakia 14.2  1.0  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
Lithuania 16.0  1.2  CIA (2012) Census 2009 
Bulgaria 16.1  0.3  CIA (2012) Census 2001 
Slovenia 16.9  3.5  CIA (2012) Census 2002 
Spain 25.6  12.3  Alesina et al. (2010) EB (2001) 1991 
Turkey 27.5  0.1  CIA (2012) Estimate 2008 
Estonia 31.3  16.0  CIA (2012) Census 2008 
Macedonia 35.8  0.2  CIA (2012) Census 2002 
Latvia 40.7  17.9  CIA (2012) Census 2009 
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  Mean  16.2  4.5      
Sources: See the Research Design section. 
Notes:  
a Secondary sources cited the corresponding primary sources. EB=Encyclopaedia Britannica. n.s.= 
not specified.  
b Malta was included in the list of emerging democracies because its first democratic election, which 
was held in 1966, took place closer to the Third Wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991) than to 
the Second Wave that followed the end of the Second World War. 
  
26 
 
 
Table 2. Hierarchical Linear Model for Ethnic Tolerance in 29 Countries, 2009 (N = 20 076) 
 
Model 
1 
 Model 
2 
 Model 
3 
 Model 
4 
 Model 
5 
 Model 
6 
 Model 
7 
 
Intercept 5.87  *** 5.83  *** 5.85  *** 5.15  *** -1.74  -1.51  -1.72  
Individual-level variable               
  Contact 0.85  *** 0.85  *** 0.85  *** 0.85  *** 0.85  *** 0.86  *** 0.64  *** 
    × Foreign pop. %, logged             0.20  *** 
  Threat -0.35  *** -0.35  *** -0.35  *** -0.35  *** -0.36  *** -0.36  *** -0.36  *** 
Education 0.20  *** 0.20  *** 0.20  *** 0.20  *** 0.20  *** 0.20  *** 0.20  *** 
Religion -0.26  *** -0.26  *** -0.26  *** -0.26  *** -0.26  *** -0.26  *** -0.26  *** 
Left-right -0.22  *** -0.22  *** -0.22  *** -0.22  *** -0.22  *** -0.22  *** -0.22  *** 
Gender 0.30  *** 0.30  *** 0.30  *** 0.30  *** 0.30  *** 0.30  *** 0.30  *** 
Age -0.01  ** -0.01  ** -0.01  ** -0.01  ** -0.01  ** -0.01  ** -0.01  ** 
Urban 0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03  
Occupation: self-employed 0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  0.10  
Occupation: manager 0.50  *** 0.50  *** 0.50  *** 0.50  *** 0.50  *** 0.50  *** 0.50  *** 
Occupation: other white collar 0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  0.14  
Occupation: manual worker -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  
Income 0.10  * 0.10  * 0.10  * 0.10  * 0.10  * 0.10  * 0.09  * 
Socioeconomic status 0.04  * 0.04  * 0.04  * 0.04  * 0.04  * 0.04  * 0.04  * 
Country-level variable               
Minority pop. %   0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  ** 0.03  ** 0.03  ** 
Foreign pop. %, logged     -0.06  -0.19  * -0.42  *** -0.45  *** -0.31  ** 
Democracy, duration        0.02  *** 0.02  *** 0.02  ** 0.02  *** 
Democracy, level         1.00  *** 0.95  *** 0.98  *** 
Per capita real GDP            0.01   
Variance component (υj) 0.92  *** 0.94  *** 0.98  *** 0.89  *** 0.87  *** 0.86  *** 0.90  *** 
Percentage explained   -2.09  -5.86  3.78  6.23  6.85  2.15  
Source: Compiled by the author from the two-level dataset. 
Notes: Entries are empirical Bayes estimates of the individual-level coefficients, generalized least 
squares estimates of the country-level coefficients, and maximum-likelihood estimates of the 
variance and covariance components. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, and *** p < 0.01.  
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